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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE Of UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14703 
RUDY DOMINGUEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. . 
---------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action in which appellant 
was charged with the crime of aggravated assault. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge, presiding. Appellant 
was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that appellant's conviction 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent stipulates to appellant's 
statement of facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN ALLOWING 
APPELLANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WITHOUT THE AID OF COUNSEL 
AT TRIAL. 
At his trial, appellant made the decision to 
stand on his right to defend himself. The Court granted 
that right. Now, on appeal, he alleges that the Court 
committed reversible error in granting his motion for 
self defense. The questions then, before this Court, are: 
1. Does the accused have the right to defend 
himself without the aid of counsel? 
2. Are there any restrictions on this right? 
3. Do any of these restrictions apply in this 
case? 
Respondent submits that the Courts and Consti-
tutions of both the United States and Utah require that 
a defendant be granted the right of self-representation 
within certain limitationsinapplicable to the instant 
case. 
1. The Courts and Constitutions of both Utah 
and the United States require that an accused be allowed 
to represent himself. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution grants to an accused in all criminal 
prosecutions the right to appear and defend himself 
in person. This language is almost identical to 
that of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, 
commenting upon this right, said: 
"The Sixth Amendment does not 
provide merely that a defense shall 
be made for the accused; it grants 
to the accused personally the right-
to make his defense. It is the 
accused, not counsel, who must be 
'informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation,·' who must be 
'confronted with the witnesses 
against him,' and who must be 
accorded 'compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor.' 
Although not stated in the Amendment 
in so many words, the right to self-
representation--to make one's own 
defense personally--is thus necessarily 
implied by the structure of the amendment." 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572, 95 S.Ct. 2525 
(1975). (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore: 
"The right to defend is given directly 
to the accused; for it is he who suffers 
the consequences if the defense fails." 
45 L.Ed.2d at 573. (Emphasis added.) 
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment to require a court to allow an accused 
the right to defend himself. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has also spoken 
out for the right of an accused to defend himself without 
a lawyer: 
"It is generally, if not 
universally held that the accused 
in a criminal proceeding who is 
sui juris and not mentally incompetent 
has the right to conduct his own 
defense without the aid of counsel. 1' 
State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 288, 
272 P.2d 195 (1954). 
2. Are there any limitations on the right to 
self representation? 
As the quote from the Utah case, supra, indicates, 
the Utah Courts have indicated that an accused must be 
"sui juris and not mentally incompetent," 2 Utah 2d at 288, 
in order to be allowed to represent him·self. The term 
"sui juris" simply means that one is capable of entering 
into a contract, or that he possesses his social and 
civil rights~in other words, that he is not under any legal 
guardianship. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed. 
1969, page 1236, or Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1968, 
page 1602. In addition to these requirements, the federal 
case asks that the accused knowingly and intelligently 
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waive his right to counsel and that the accused be 
made aware of the dangers of self-representation. 
Faretta, supra, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-582. 
3. Do any of these limitations apply here? 
Respondent submits that the present appeal 
is without merit since none of the above limitations 
apply in the present case. In the first place, there 
is no question but that defendant was sui juris. He 
was of age and under no legal guardianship. Appellant 
has failed to show, or even allege, any evidence to the 
contrary. Secondly, there is no showing that appellant 
did not knowingly waive his right to counsel. On the 
contrary, in a minute entry dated June 22, 1976, it is 
recorded that appellant was made fully aware, by the 
Court, of the consequences of self-representation. 
Third, appellant has failed to show that he was not 
made aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation. 
Again on the contrary, the minute entry reports that 
the Court fully advised the appellant as to the procedures 
involved in representing himself, and what the consequences 
could be. See Record on Appeal, un-numbered page. As 
the Supreme Court pointed out, whether or not an accused 
possesses technical legal knowledge is not relevant to the 
-6-
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to the question of whether or not he knowingly chose to 
represent himself. Faretta, supra at 582. Finally, 
appellant has failed to adequately prove that he was 
not mentally competent to defend himself. Appellant 
argues that if he was insane at the time of the crime, 
then it is arguable that he might have been at least 
incompetent at the time of trial. The problem here 
is that the jury found that appellant was not insane. 
In conclusion, there was absolutely no 
justification for the trial judge to withhold appellant's 
right to defend himself. 
Appellant would argue, however, that he did 
not have enough time to ·prepare and that he was illiterate, ··· 
implying that these facts would be a substantial basis 
for denying his self-repr~sentation rights. Respoadent 
would submit that there is no foundation in any of the 
cases for such an implication. Neither the Utah Court 
or the United States Supreme Court require that a man 
must be literate in order to defend himself, and as for 
being prepared, this is not the same as if appellant bad 
brought a new lawyer into the case. Appellant had at 
least as much experience with this as his attorney. 
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If the above were not enough, respondent has 
two further arguments for affirming appellant's convic-
tion. First, this is not a case wherein a man defends 
himself entirely alone. The court appointed a Mr. Jensen 
to be "stand-by" counsel for appellant. Numerous times 
during the trial Mr. Jensen interrupted in order to 
assist appellant in his defense (T.5,9,12,14,15,21,22, 
30,31,37,39,42,47,57, et al.). At times, Mr. Jensen took 
over the examination of witnesses (T.58). He objected 
to instructions (T.88) and even argued the case to the 
jury (T.88). In other words, appellant was protected, 
guided and assisted most of the time by a lawyer. There-
fore, this is not an ordinary case of total self-representa· 
tion and this Court should take that into consideration. 
Secondly, in Utah, an appellant may not induce error and 
then use it as a method of obtaining a new trial. If 
there was any error in allowing appellant to represent 
himself it was clearly self-induced; therefore, his 
appeal must fail. State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 
501 P.2d 107 (1972). 
POINT II 
IF ERROR, THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
-8-
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Appellant alleges that he was damaged by the 
instructions that were given to the jury on the issue 
of insanity. He claims that the instructions should 
have been that he could be found not guilty by reason 
of insanity if he "lacked the substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions." As it 
was, the instruction was that he could be found not 
guilty by reason of insanity only if he did not know 
that what he was doing was wrong. 
Respondent submits that if there is any error 
in the instruction as given, it is harmless. Harmless 
error may not be the basis for a new trial or reversal. 
State v. Winkle, 535 P.2d 82 (Utah· 1975). 
The judge said appellant could be found guilty 
if he knew that he had a knife and if he knew.it was 
wrong to use it (Instruction No. 4, second paragraph). 
Therefore, if a jury felt that he partly knew, but not 
fully, he could be found innocent. That would be 
exactly the same as if the judge had instructed that 
insanity means he could not fully appreciate the wrong. 
Both instructions are the same in that they do not 
require an absolute knowledge. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court acted correctly in 
allowing appellant to represent himself, and becaus~ 
the trial judge gave the correct. instruction, the 
conviction of appellant should be affirmed. 
-10-
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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